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Criticism of Knapsack Encryption Scheme 
Sattar J Aboud 
Abstract— In this paper, we analyze a knapsack schemes. The one is suggested by Su, which is relied on a new method en-
titled permutation combination method. We demonstrate that this permutation method is useless to the security of the scheme. 
Since the special super increasing construction, we can break this scheme employ the algorithm provided by Shamir scheme. 
Finally, we provide an enhanced version of Su scheme to avoid these attacks. 
 
Index Terms— knapsack problem, public key scheme, cryptanalysis  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
HE knapsack problem is a well-known NP-complete 
problem. This problem is declared by provided posi-
tive integer elements naaa ,...,, 21  and s , if there is a 
subset of ia that sums to s . That is equal to determine if 
there are nmm ,...,1 where i
m
i
i ams *
1


  such that 
)1,0(im  where ni 1    (1.1)  
     The density of the knapsack is deter-
mined And 2log/ , such that ini aA *max1  . The diffi-
culty of knapsack system motivated many public key 
schemes in the eighties, following the influential work of 
Merkle and Hellman [1]. Though the underlying problem 
is NP-complete, it has astonishingly been broken by Sha-
mir [2] since of the special construction of the secret key. 
Later, many variants have been demonstrated insecure 
for practical applications by lattice reduction methods [3], 
also, Baocang Wang, Hui Liu and Yupu Hu [4] reported 
that common knapsack can be solved under the actuality 
of an Oracle when the density 646.0d , which is wide-
spread by Coster [5, 6] to 9408.0 . In fact, we can employ 
the celebrated LLL method [7, 8] instead of the Oracle in 
practical parameters. But, most of suggested knapsack 
systems have been broken except Okamoto, Tanaka and 
Uchiyama, quantum knapsack scheme [9]. Either by spe-
cial construction for example Merkle and Hellman 
scheme and Chor and Rivest scheme [10]. To make sure 
of the challenge of low-density attack, it is proposed that 
the density d should be bigger than 9408.0  [5, 11]. Lately, 
some knapsack schemes with high density have sug-
gested [12, 13]. 
     In this paper, we study a Su knapsack scheme [14]. 
This scheme considered a new permutation method en-
titled permutation combination method, by developing 
this method to avoid the low-density attack. We demon-
strate that the permutation method is useless to avoid the 
low-density attack and the density of knapsack sequence 
is lesser than 9408.0 . But, when we employ the low-
density scheme, the dimension of the lattice is 1025, 
which is very large to employ LLL method [7]. Since of 
the special super increasing construction, we can get 
equal secret keys by Shamir scheme. We demonstrate that 
one can decrypt the message if he can solve a knapsack 
scheme such as the Merkle and Hellman scheme. In this 
paper, we study Shamir attack on the basic Merkle and 
Hellman knapsack scheme. Initially, we provide a concise 
description of the pioneering Merkle and Hellman knap-
sack scheme. The sender selects a super increasing vec-
tor ),...,,( 21 nbbbB  , that is 


1
1
j
i
ij bb such that 
nj 2  and two positive integers w and p , with 



n
i
ibp
1
where 1),gcd( pw calculates pwba ii mod*'    
where pai  '0      (2.1)  
Then chooses a permutation  of ),...,2,1( n  and deter-
mines ' )(ii aa  where ni 1   
2  KNAPSACK PUBLIC KEY SCHEME  
The public key is the vector of n  positive integers 
nnaa ,...,, 21  and the secret key is the super increasing vec-
tor B ,the integers pw,  and the permutation .Typically, 
the length of every ib is in  bits, for ni 1 , the length 
of p is 1*2 n bits. In the original Merkle and Hellman 
scheme 100n  the message ),...,( 1 nxxm  is encrypted as  
i
n
i
i axc *
1


 and the receiver calculates  
            pwcm mod* 1  
                 pwax i
n
i
i mod**
1
1


  
                  pwax i
n
i
i mod**
1'
)(
1


   
T
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                  pbx i
n
i
i mod* )(
1


  
Because 


n
i
ibp
1
, we can get that )(
1
* i
n
i
i bxc 

  , the 
formula is simple to solve because the ib form a super 
increasing vector. Let pwu mod1 , where mu 0 , 
from formula     (2.1)  
pwba ii mod*)(  We have puab ii mod*)(  .This 
means that there is certain integer ik  where 
)(** iii bpkua  , hence  pa
b
a
k
p
u
i
i
i
i
*
)(  . The cryp-
tanalyst does not know ikpu ,,,  , and ib . But he can ob-
tain the length of ia where ni 1 and u are the same as 
sp'  with inib
 2 . The first five factors of the super vec-
tor satisfy that inib
 2  where 51  i .  Let )(1 ji j   , 
then we get 2*4
5
2
2


 n
n
i
i
j
j
a
k
p
u where 51  j       (2.2) 
and subtract 1j  term from the others, we 
have 4*32
1
1  n
i
i
i
i
a
k
a
k
j
j where 52  j . This implies 
that 62**
11
 niiii jj akak where 52  j    (2.3)  
     Formula (2.3) demonstrate how unusual 
jia  and jik  
are. Finally, the length of every of them is n*2  bits, thus 
the length of 
1
* ii ak j and jii ak *1  is n*4  bits. However 
the length of the difference of two such terms to be 6n  
bits, which requires certain special construction. Shamir 
core contribution was to observe that 
jik can be found in 
polynomial time by invoking Lenstra theorem that the 
integer programming problem in a determined number of 
variables can be solved in polynomial time [2]. But, the 
cryptanalyst must invoke
5
n  times of Lenstra integer pro-
gramming method since he does not know the permuta-
tion . This produces the 
jik where 51  j . Once jik are 
found, one gets an estimate to pu / from the formula (2.2) 
and builds a pair ),( '' pu  with '' / pu  close to pu / where 
the weights get by '' mod* puac ii  where '0 pci   
such that ni 1  form a super increasing vector. Thus 
one can obtain an equal private key in polynomial time. 
3 LOW DENSITY ATTACKS 
In this section, we will present the low density attack 
suggested by Coster [5] which is the modification of La-
garias and Odlyzko attack [4]. The knapsack system is 
declared as follows: For provided positive integers 
naa ,...,1  and s  obtain variables nee ,...,1  with )1,0(ie  
where sae i
n
i
i 

*
1
. Determine the sequences 11,..., nbb  
as follow:  
  )*,0,...,0,1( 1anbi   
  )*,0,...,1,0( 22 anb   
           :  
           :  
   )*,1,...,0,0( nn anb   
   )*,
2
1,...,
2
1,
2
1(1 snbn   
     Such that nn
2
1 . Let L  be the lattice spanned by 
the sequences 11,..., nbb . Observe that the sequence 
Leee n  )0,,...,( ''1  such that 2
1 iei ee  Coster demon-
strated that if the density 9408.0d , the sequence e is 
shortest sequence in L . Thus one can obtain e  when there 
is a SVP oracle. In reality, we usually employ LLL method 
[6] or other lattice bases reduction method [8] instead of 
the SVP oracle. But, it is thought that if the dimension is 
big sufficient for example bigger than 400[15], one cannot 
obtain the shortest sequence for random lattice. 
4   DESCRIPTION OF SU SCHEME 
We will depict the Su scheme [14] which is relied on the 
use of the elliptic curve logarithm problem and knapsack 
problem as follows: In first stage, the user chooses the 
elliptic curve domain elements. 
 A curve bxaxy  *32  over pF  such that 
0*27*4 23  ba . 
 A point ),( 00 yxh    where phord )( such that p  is 
a prime number. 
 A super increasing vector ),...,,( 21' naaav  , where 



1
1
1 ,2
i
j
ji
n aaa  such that ni 2  where 
n
na
*22 such that pa
n
i
i 
1
.  
 Determine the vector hav i * where ni 1  
 Choose a permutation  of ),...,2,1( n   
 Choose integer number de,  where 1),gcd( ep , such 
that pde mod1*   
 Suppose hpaesw ii *))mod*(( )( where ni 1  
 Suppose )mod*( )( paetf ii  where ni 1  
 The public key is ,,, hwv p . The private key is ,, de  
and the super increasing vector 'v . 
 
Encryption  
 Entity B  must do the following:  
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 Encrypts the original message ),...,( 1 nmmM   to be 
passed as yx  points
imo . Thus the message be-
comes ),...,(
1 nmm ooM    
 Selects a binary message ),...,,( 21 nxxxz   
 Selects an arbitrary integer number r  where pr  .  
 If 1ix  determine ),*( iji smm rohrC  , else, add 
confusing information to
imo  . The encrypted message 
is ptxCCCc i
n
i
immm n mod*||...||||
1
21 

  
 Send c to entity A  
 
Decryption  
Entity  A  must do the following: 
 Finds ptxdCeCeCeg iimmm n mod**||*...,||*||* 21   
such that haresroCe iimm ***** )(11   
11
*** )( mim ohaero        (5.1)  
 Because 


n
i
iiii
n
i
ii axpaxptxd
1
)()(
1
*mod*mod**    
 Entity A can get ),...,( 1 nxxz  by solving the super 
increasing knapsack and gets 
imo from formula (5.1) 
for 1ix .  
 Decrypts 
1mo  to obtain the message m  
4.1 Attack of Su Scheme 
Notice that the vector ),...,( 1 nxxz   is influential. From 
this sequence, Entity A can obtain the right 
imC  from the 
confusing information. Initially, we provide a known the 
sequence z attack and this attack will be employed in the 
following. Known z Attack when we know the se-
quence ),...,,( 21 nxxxz  , from formula (5.1), we 
know haresroCe iimm ij ***** )( . We observe 
that )(* ii aet  . Then we can get that 
hrtsroharesroCe iimiimm iij ******** )(  
 unfortunately, the set f  is the public key in the scheme.      
Thus we can decrypt the message if we know the set z . 
Find the set z . To find the set z , we should solve a Merkle 
and Hellman algorithm. Now we have a super increasing 
vector ),...,( 1
'
naav  satisfies na 21  suchthat 


1
1
i
j
ji aa  
where ni 2 such that nna *22  where 


n
i
p
1
and a 
permutation   and the public key is the vector 
paetf ii mod* )( where ni 1 .  The private key is 
,,' ev while the density
2
1
*2log2

n
n
o
nd . If n  is 
moderate, we can employ low density attack [4, 5] to ob-
tain the set z . When n  is big, we can still obtain the set 
z by employing Shamir scheme. As a result, we can de-
termine the message after performing a known z attack. 
Lastly, we provide an enhanced version of this scheme to 
prevent the known z attack. In Su paper, if 1ix ,        
determine )*,**( imm srohrC ji  . When we rearrange 
)*,**( )( imim sroharC ji   , this enhanced scheme will 
be safer than the old scheme. Though one can obtain the 
set z  cannot get back
imo , since e  is the private key and 
it is difficult to calculate the elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem. 
5  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study a new scheme relied on knapsack 
system. The security level of the encryption scheme is 
overestimated. We can break Su scheme employ Shamir 
scheme and decrypt the message of the scheme. 
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